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ABSTRACT
A new approach is needed to tackle the climate crisis, in which the long overlooked
supply-side of fossil fuels takes centre stage. A crucial aspect of this is the need for
international agreements and law to eﬀectively and fairly leave large swathes of
remaining fossil fuels in the ground. Towards that end, we make the case for a
Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT) to deal with emissions at source.
Having explained the need for such a treaty, we propose overall aims, and both a
process and principles for the sequencing of eﬀorts across fuel types and regions
based on equity and justice. We discuss the form an FF-NPT could take, as well as
some of the key challenges it would have to overcome. We suggest strategies for
overcoming key challenges in relation to reserves in developing countries,
questions of the just transition, and incentives for countries to sign up to such a treaty.
Key policy insights
. The supply-side of fossil fuels should occupy a central place in collective eﬀorts to
address climate change.
. A proposed new Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT) could help to keep
large swathes of fossil fuels in the ground, eﬀectively and fairly.
. A process towards this end could start with an assessment of existing reserves, as
well as agreement on the principles for the sequencing of production phase-down
targets across countries and fuel types, with the aim of aligning fossil fuel use with
the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C warming threshold.
. Strategies to advance the proposed FF-NPT will have to recognize current and
historical exploitation of fossil fuel reserves, provide alternative ways of meeting
the development needs of the poorest countries without fossil fuels, and include
credible systems of monitoring and compliance to induce trust and cooperation.
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A new, complementary approach is needed to tackle the climate crisis. A line in the sand is needed to underpin
the existing Paris Agreement and exert inﬂuence over the immediate choices of policymakers. The latest UN
Environment Programme (UNEP) report on The Emissions Gap states:
Pathways reﬂecting current NDCs [nationally-determined contributions] imply global warming of about 3°C by 2100, with
warming continuing afterwards. If the emissions gap is not closed by 2030, it is very plausible that the goal of a well-below
2°C temperature increase is also out of reach. (UNEP, 2018, p. 4)
The latest ﬁndings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special report on Global Warming
of 1.5 degrees (SR15) call for carbon emissions to be cut overall by 45% by 2030 and for investments in fossil fuel
extraction and unabated (without carbon capture and storage (CCS)) power generation to fall by up to US$0.85
trillion over 2016–2050, with unabated coal falling to zero by 2030 (IPCC, 2018). At the time of writing, however,
global demand for coal, oil and gas are all growing (IEA, 2018), with fossil fuels accounting for 81% of energy use.
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The International Energy Agency projects that total fossil fuel use will rise for decades to come (WEO, 2018). Yet
Carbon Tracker (2013) suggests that even to keep warming below 2°C, 80% of coal, oil and gas reserves are now
unburnable. Doubts concerning the potential contribution of as-yet embryonic negative emissions technologies
(Keary, 2016), and the limited development of CCS, that are built into models mean the proportion of unburn-
able reserves may be even higher (Anderson & Peters, 2016).
Pressure in the wake of the Paris Agreement and statements from the Group of 7 that fossil fuel emissions
should not be allowed in any sector of the economy by the end of the century (Connolly, 2015) send clear signals
about the overall direction of change. When combined with principles of equity and burden-sharing, we argue
these aims imply a moratorium in rich countries on any further expansion of the fossil fuel industry, or any infra-
structure heavily dependent on it. We argue that international agreements and law to ensure that large swathes
of remaining fossil fuels are eﬀectively and fairly left in the ground are urgently needed to implement such a
moratorium. Towards that end, we make the case for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT).
Though calls for a coal convention have been made before by academics (Burke, Fishel, Mitchell, Dalby, &
Levine, 2016; Christoﬀ & Eckersley, 2013) and leaders such as former President Tong of Kiribati, while dialogues
such as the 2015 Suva Declaration on Climate Change have called for a moratorium on the construction of new
coal mines, we argue that a more general FF-NPT is needed, since the majority of remaining oil and gas reserves
must also remain in the ground. According to the IPCC SR15, limiting warming to 1.5°C requires ‘transformative
systemic change’, involving the upscaling and acceleration of far-reaching climate mitigation across all regions
and sectors (IPCC, 2018). This will not happen while access to fossil fuel reserves remains unconstrained.
In this paper, we ﬁrstly discuss the context for a new global supply-side FF-NPT by documenting the recent
rise in supply-side restrictions being adopted by governments at the national level, demonstrating political
appetite for a fresh approach. Secondly, we sketch the broad contours of the proposed FF-NPT. Thirdly, we
address the issue of how to build political support for such an FF-NPT.
Climate for change? The rise of supply side actions
Despite the neglect of supply-side solutions through international law (Piggot, Erickson, van Asselt, & Lazarus,
2018), at the national level, there have been recent bold moves by governments to leave fossil fuels in the
ground (Erickson, Lazarus, & Piggot, 2018) which suggest scope for collective coordination and international over-
sight of further such eﬀorts. Examples include recentmoratoria on newoil exploration andproduction announced
in 2017 and 2018 by a number of countries including New Zealand, France and Belize, as well as Costa Rica, which
has amoratorium on oil exploration in place that has been extended to 2021. There are alsomoratoria in place on
hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) in a number of jurisdictions globally such as France, Germany, Ireland, Wales, Scot-
land and Uruguay, and hundreds of subnational jurisdictions. Other countries, such as the UK, Spain and China,
have set near-term timetables for the phasing out of existing fossil fuels (especially coal). Indeed, the ‘Powering
Past Coal Alliance’, launched in November 2017, includes more than 25 nations that have pledged to phase out
coal-ﬁred power generation. Membership of the Alliance requires states to make (non-binding) public declara-
tions that they will refrain from building new, unabated coal-ﬁred power stations and will phase out existing
ones (PPCA, 2018). Norway’s sovereign wealth fund has also divested from coal stocks, while Ireland’s Parliament
has voted to require its sovereign wealth fund to divest from all fossil fuel stocks.
Internationally, there are precedents for bans on fossil fuels such as the moratorium in place for mining pro-
jects in Antarctica (Article 7 of the Environmental Protocol of the Antarctic Treaty). The International Council on
Mining and Metals has committed its members (including the World Coal Association) to neither explore nor
mine in World Heritage Sites and to ‘respect legally designated protected areas’ (ICMM, 2003). Likewise, there
are calls for banning oil drilling in the Arctic Sea and to halt exploitation in protected areas and on indigenous
lands (LINGO, 2018). The 2017 Lofoten Declaration meanwhile, signed by over 500 organizations, highlights the
need to put an end to fossil fuel development and manage the decline of existing production.
Such supply-side policies are underpinned by the emergence of what Green (2018) describes as ‘anti-fossil
fuel norms’ (AFFN), which are created and reinforced by sustained pressure from fossil fuel divestment and
broader climate movements, as well as concern on the part of ﬁnancial actors about potentially ‘stranded’
assets in their portfolios (Grantham Institute, 2013). Such norms impact upon state behaviour through
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mechanisms of ‘international socialization’ and ‘domestic political mobilization’. They are often driven and
diﬀused by organized movements such as that around divestment (Bergman, 2018) and led by norm entrepre-
neurs such as Bill McKibben, co-founder of 350.org, or Pope Francis, for example, who endorsed the phasing out
of fossil fuels in his encyclical, ‘Laudato Si’ (Kirchgaessner, 2015). In this sense, as Green (2018, p. 113) argues,
‘structural conditions are more conducive than at any previous time to the spread of AFFNs’ including the
rise of supply-side actions described above.
The proposal for a fossil fuel non-proliferation Treaty
Analogies and precedents: the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and beyond
The idea of non-proliferation ﬁrst emerged in the context of eﬀorts to counter the threat of nuclear war through
the creation of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Interestingly, parallels are increasingly drawn between the
scale of the threat posed by nuclear weapons and that of runaway climate change by actors as diverse as
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Embury-Dennis, 2017), the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, 2019) and the World Economic Forum, which names ‘weapons of mass destruction’
and ‘failure of climate mitigation and adaptation’ as the top two threats facing the world (WEF, 2019). The par-
allel was, in fact, perhaps most clearly articulated more than three decades ago in the statement from the
Toronto Conference on a Changing Atmosphere in 1988 that ‘Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncon-
trolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a nuclear war’.
The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), agreed just over 50 years ago between 1965 and 1968, was a
triumph of rapid diplomacy, at the height of cold war mistrust, and against an immense security threat.
Former US arms negotiator Robert Grey said the NPT ‘is in many ways an agreement as important as the UN
charter itself’ (quoted in Bunn, 2003, p. 4). As Kuppuswamy suggests (2006, p. 142) ‘It has been hailed as one
of the great success stories of arms control and an indispensable tool in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons’. It is noteworthy that the NPT is the only international convention that addresses non-proliferation
issues comprehensively and has been signed by 191 states. It has also obtained a near universal membership,
and the obligations of the state parties to the treaty acquired permanence after the indeﬁnite extension in 1995
of the treaty, which includes ﬁve yearly reviews to monitor progress and ratchet up commitments. More
countries have adhered to the NPT than to any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement (UNODA,
2019). The conclusion of the Treaty within such a short time frame was an impressive achievement given the
levels of distrust and the entrenched and rivalrous power politics prevalent at the time. Negotiations began
in a context of ‘stalled nuclear disarmament negotiations’ and ‘acute tensions over the nuclear aspects of Euro-
pean security’ (Simpson & Elbahtimy, 2018, p. 14). The speed with which the Treaty is currently being re-nego-
tiated as part of the 2020 review cycle is also notable, accelerated by the remarkable conclusion of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (or Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty) in 2017.
Our purpose here is to invoke the nuclear NPT as a useful analogy for eﬀorts to multilateralise supply-side
policy on climate change. In doing so, it is worth noting ongoing concerns about the nuclear regime’s eﬀective-
ness, especially around enforcement given the slow pace of disarmament and the ease of withdrawal from the
Treaty, an issue that threatens all multilateral processes. In the case of the NPT, it is in the interest of the world’s
most powerful countries – who already possess nuclear weapons – to ensure that others do not acquire similar
capabilities. In the case of climate change, however, the majority of countries in the world already have at least
some reserves of fossil fuels, even though these are unevenly distributed. The challenge is then how to negotiate
their non-use in a fair and credible way at the speed and scale required to avoid a collective threat to all states
and their citizens. In this sense multilateral responses may be attractive to powerful countries wanting to ensure
other states do not free-ride on commitments they are now making to leave fossil fuels in the ground. They
would, in fact, be doing so in response to a threat which, through the climate negotiations and G7 statements,
they have already committed themselves to addressing. Powerful countries are also not immune to the anti-
fossil fuel norms described above and indeed many of the groups that have articulated such norms most
clearly are based in countries such as the US and EU. What is useful and analogous for the purposes of our
discussion here, however, is less the question of the eﬀectiveness of the NPT and more the precedent it provides
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in terms of both the speed with which the agreement was concluded and its structure. Hence our purpose in
invoking the NPT is to (i) establish the principle of non-proliferation as key to a new supply-side agreement (ii) to
draw parallels with the principles and structure that might underpin the proposed FF-NPT and (iii) to show how
rapidly such an agreement can be concluded even in the face of a challenging political environment.
There are also other precedents whose lessons could be further explored for the light they might shed on the
politics of designing an FF-NPT. These include treaties on landmines and chemical weapons, or the World Health
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, whose deﬁnition of the scope of ‘tobacco control’
includes supply strategies, as well as demand and harm reduction. Restrictive supply-side policies have also
played an important role in eﬀorts to address other environmental challenges, including ozone-depleting sub-
stances (Benedick, 1991), asbestos (Waldman, 2011), and lead in petroleum products.
Three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use
The NPT has a three-pillar structure that its fossil fuel equivalent could emulate. The ﬁrst is ‘non-proliferation’
itself, which in the climate change case would refer to preventing the exploitation of new fossil fuel resources:
at minimum, do no further harm. As the Lofoten Declaration states, ‘We are in a deep hole with climate. We must
begin by not digging ourselves any deeper’ (Lofoten declaration, 2018).
An overall guiding principle would have to be the percentages of each fossil fuel that need to remain in the
ground, based on models such as those produced by McGlade and Ekins (2015) and continually revised in line
with knowledge about what is required to keep warming below 1.5°C. This would be akin to the NPT process
where ﬁve yearly reviews are undertaken, and aligns well with the stock-taking exercises proposed as part of
the Paris Agreement. The FF-NPT would be a mechanism for coordinating and verifying these obligations.
Addressing non-proliferation in the nuclear case required a stock take of who had what weapons. There
could be a similar global mapping and assessment of those fossil fuel reserves which, if burned, would carry
us across the 1.5°C warming line. The assessment could be undertaken by the International Energy Agency
(IEA) or a UN body, just as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) performs that function for the NPT.
This assessment would require reporting from national energy ministries on existing reserves. It is possible to
produce such an assessment. According to Carbon Tracker’s Mark Campanale, ‘[t]he fossil fuel industry knows
with some certainty future production often decades in advance… . What we need is a global, public register
setting out who controls the reserves from where the CO2 is coming’ (quoted in Simms & Newell, 2018). SEI
(2018) also show how the adoption of a simple ‘extraction-based accounting system’ – in parallel with existing
territorial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting – could help track countries’ production levels and
associated emissions. International agencies such as UNEP could also regularly release an analysis (akin to
the existing Emissions Gap Report) that would identify whether countries’ aggregate production phase-down
targets and policies (see below) align with the 1.5-2°C warming limit. This could be combined with the creation
of national committees, independent of government, which would track and report on carbon budgets, for
which governments are held to account.
Reporting and monitoring of supply-side measures to ensure non-proliferation should be easier than for
many other climate policy tools currently in use. First, it would target a relatively small number of large,
easily identiﬁable projects operated by administratively competent ﬁrms upstream in the fossil fuel supply
chain. Fossil fuel infrastructures are easily observable by satellite and so can straightforwardly be monitored
by governments, international institutions and civil society organizations alike. Second, the commodities to
be accounted for are not only much easier to monitor and measure than GHG emissions (especially coal and
oil), but they are typically already measured by ﬁrms for existing administrative purposes such as resource
tax liability assessment and compliance with local environmental license conditions (Green & Dennis, 2018).
Mutually veriﬁed compliance would help to build trust, encouraging states to escalate their commitments
over time as repeated cycles of reciprocal action-and veriﬁcation build their conﬁdence in the integrity of an
FF-NPT (Ruzicka & Wheeler, 2010). There are precedents here from the Chemical Weapons Convention,
whose system includes routine inspections, as well as a ‘challenge inspection’, which can be triggered by
states if they suspect another state is noncompliant. Accused states that deny inspectors access face sanctions
and other collective measures in conformity with international law (Thakur & Haru, 2006). Moreover, as Green
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and Dennis (2018, p. 84) note, since the Paris Agreement’s success is predicated on states’ gradual escalation of
their commitments over time, commitments to implement supply-side policies oﬀer major advantages as ‘a cur-
rency of international climate cooperation’, demonstrating the seriousness of their ambition by leaving certain
reserves of fossil fuels in the ground. Hence, such policies could be counted as key measures in countries’ NDCs,
as well as logged in the inventory we propose below to build momentum while the details of the FF-NPT are
agreed so as not to delay progress.
The second pillar of the NPT is ‘disarmament’ since non-proliferation is not sustainable without disarmament.
A secondary goal of the FF-NPT would then be to coordinate the managed and accelerated decline of existing
fossil fuel infrastructures. But disarmament would also be delivered not just by restricting supply, but also redu-
cing demand. This could be achieved through better planning around energy, housing, transport and food and
the construction of climate smart cities for example, all of which can and should be covered under the NDCs to
which all parties to the Paris Agreement are already committed.
The ﬁnal pillar concerns the promotion of the ‘peaceful’ use of technology. The ‘basic bargain’ in the NPT was
that, in return for foregoing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states secured from
the nuclear states a commitment to provide them with nuclear technology suitable for the development of civil
nuclear energy industries and to restrain the vertical spiral in nuclear weapon inventories (Smith, 1987). In a
climate context, that would mean massively expanding existing initiatives to provide poorer countries with
access to low carbon and non-fossil-fuel clean energy and transport, and the technology needed for its devel-
opment. Funds could be redirected from fossil fuel subsidies which make up the equivalent of 6.5% of global
GDP, as well as generated through a global carbon tax and potentially held in the Global Transition Fund
that we propose below (Coady, Parry, Sears, & Shang, 2015). The IMF found, for example, that eliminating
post-tax subsidies could raise government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6% of global GDP), cut global CO2 emis-
sions by more than 20%, and cut premature air pollution deaths by more than half (Coady et al., 2015).
Burden-sharing principles
Based on the global map and assessment of the distribution of fossil fuels proposed above, it will become clear
which level of contribution a country is being expected to make by leaving reserves in the ground. Given
diﬀerent endowments of fossil fuels among countries, a calculation of their ﬁnancial value would have to be
made, so it is clear what degree of sacriﬁce each country is making for the common good and equitable
degrees of burden-sharing can be allocated. Negotiations towards an NPT would necessarily and undoubtedly
link across diﬀerent fossil fuels based on the ﬁnancial value of the respective reserves; some countries would
leave more coal, oil or gas in the ground depending on the location of reserves and their value, and in light
of which targets other countries are committing to.
Burden-sharing would be reﬂected principally through diﬀerentiated targets and timetables for ﬁrst halting,
and then phasing out, fossil fuel production by countries. Criteria for allocating and sequencing responsibility
would include that (i) the costs of action should be borne disproportionately by those who have the greatest
ability to pay deﬁned by per capita income levels and that are best placed to redirect ﬁnance, production
and technology towards lower carbon alternatives (ii) the greatest emitters of GHG emissions from the direct
burning of their own fossil fuel reserves should act ﬁrst (iii) cumulative emissions are assessed to take adequate
account of historical responsibility and use of fossil fuels to date (Collier & Venables, 2014). These are principles
which in diﬀerent ways are already embedded in the climate regime around notions such as ‘common but diﬀer-
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’.
These three criteria broadly imply OECD countries, plus the Russian Federation (OECD+), taking the lead in
the ﬁrst instance with near-term targets and timetables for the phase out of fossil fuels. In the words of the
Lofoten Declaration, ‘leadership must come from countries that are high-income, have beneﬁtted from fossil
fuel extraction, and that are historically responsible for signiﬁcant emissions’. Many of the world’s largest and
most powerful private fossil fuel companies have their home base in OECD+ countries, such that to avoid pro-
blems of carbon leakage and to improve ease of compliance, fossil fuel assets held overseas by a country’s home
companies would be subject to supply-side commitments under an FF-NPT. This is similar to other international
legal and quasi-legal approaches to the conduct of transnational corporations overseas, which expect
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compliance with home country regulations when operating abroad (Newell, 2001). This is critical because just six
of the largest listed oil and gas companies alone hold reserves that together would use up more than a quarter
of the remaining 2°C budget (McKibben, 2012). And historically speaking, just 90 companies have caused two-
thirds of anthropogenic global warming emissions including OECD based companies such as Chevron, Exxon,
Shell and BP and half of the estimated emissions were produced in the past 25 years – well past the date
when governments and corporations became aware that rising GHG emissions from the burning of coal and
oil were causing dangerous climate change (Heede, 2014).
A second tier of next mover countries would be large non-OECD emitters such as China, India, Brazil and
Indonesia, all of whom feature in the top ten global GHG emitters which together account for nearly three-quar-
ters of global emissions (WRI, 2017). Given the size of their economies and populations, decisions they make
about energy pathways and infrastructures will have a critical bearing on the success of the FF-NPT. Several
are leaders in the development and adoption of renewable energy and most now enjoy levels of growth and
access to public and private ﬁnance that will allow them to ﬁnance alternatives to fossil fuels and forego sub-
stantial reserves of fossil fuels. These countries would expect, nevertheless, to take on longer phase down
targets and timetables than OECD+ countries because of their reduced historical responsibility for climate
change.
Over time though, to be eﬀective, the FF-NPT Treaty would need to go beyond current large emitters with the
greatest capacity to transition away from fossil fuels and that bear most historical responsibility for climate
change, and include most UN members to ensure that poorer countries are not locked-in to high carbon path-
ways. It would need to help ﬁnance, including through the redirection of fossil fuel subsidies as well as multi-
lateral development bank and donor support, lower carbon infrastructures and technologies to meet the energy
and other developmental needs of the world’s poor. This it could do through the proposed Global Transition
Fund described below.
The economics of restrictions to supply raise the prospect of the ‘green paradox’ whereby (Sinn, 2012)
countries might race to extract resources that might become ‘stranded’ (that is, unusable), driving up fossil
fuel production in the short-term. Yet credible attempts to restrict supply will induce expectations of high
fossil fuel prices and stimulate investment in low carbon technologies and infrastructures as well as reducing
consumption of fossil fuels worldwide with multiple climate and other beneﬁts. This is a key argument for
ensuring the global coverage of an FF-NPT over time. Another concern relates to the specter of rising electri-
city costs. Indeed, the cost of electricity generated from fossil fuels would increase, to reﬂect its true social and
environmental costs. But low carbon forms of electricity would become more aﬀordable and available as is
happening at present with the falling costs of solar in particular. It is clearly also the case that the FF-NPT
would not exist in isolation from other policy measures such as carbon taxes and eﬀorts to support renewable
energy provision.
Beyond suggesting ﬁrst principles, it is diﬃcult to anticipate, let alone directly proscribe, the nature of issue-
linkage that states would want to engage in in order to arrive at an FF-NPT that is both eﬀective in climate terms
and perceived as equitable. The hope would be that once a critical mass of states takes further action along
these lines, further momentum and norm building will occur as the pressure to take action mounts and incen-
tives to free-ride diminish. The desire to minimize carbon leakage and prevent other states from free-riding
would incentivise ﬁrst-mover governments to encourage others to adopt supply-side policy interventions. Like-
wise, the precise nature of the national targets and timetables to achieve non-proliferation and then to phase
out fossil fuel production is diﬃcult to foresee, but would be need to be negotiated according to the burden
sharing criteria outlined above.
Sequencing of actions
We have argued that all fossil fuels would need to be on the table in negotiations towards an FF-NPT as there
would need to be bargaining across oil, coal and gas, given their uneven distribution across countries. A ﬁrst
principle, however, might be to prioritize the most carbon intensive fuels. Given the carbon intensity of coal,
its diminishing ﬁnancial viability and its substitutability in most cases, it might be an appropriate focus for
the ﬁrst wave of negotiations. For example, Collier and Venables (2014, p. 492) suggest:
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Coal is singled out because of its high emissions intensity, low rents per unit value, local environmental costs, and sheer scale.
Direct supply policy—the sequenced closure of coal mines—may lead to less policy leakage (across countries and time) than
other policies based on demand or price management. It also has the advantage of involving relatively few players and leading
to clear-cut and observable outcomes. Appropriately sequenced closure of the world coal industry could, we suggest, create
the moral force needed to mobilize collective international action.
At present, 43% of CO2 emissions come from fuel combustion and nearly 25% of total CO2 equivalent emissions
come from coal (Collier & Venables, 2014). Further, both the level and share of coal in emissions has been
increasing. Coal has markedly higher emissions of CO2 and other pollutants per unit of energy than other
fossil fuels and the prospect of the widespread use of widely vaunted CCS technologies remains remote.
Hence any successful strategy for combating climate change will have the phasing out of coal as a major con-
sequence (Collier & Venables, 2014).
Given that there are only a few countries whose coal industry is currently material, a truly global sequence is
unnecessary, potentially simplifying the process of agreement (Collier & Venables, 2014, p. 506). These countries
are China, USA, India, Australia, Russia, Germany, Poland, Indonesia, and South Africa. Though they diﬀer hugely
on all three criteria identiﬁed above – income, current emissions, and past cumulative emissions – in weighting
these, a fairly clear sequence of action would emerge. The US, Australia and Germany can readily be identiﬁed as
the ﬁrst movers. The next group is probably Russia and Poland, both upper-middle-income countries with a long
history of high carbon emissions. After them come China and South Africa, followed by Indonesia and India.
Agreement to lead in closure would be conditional on those expected to act later not increasing their pro-
duction in the meantime, hence undermining the temptation to extract assets likely to become stranded
under the treaty (Sinn, 2012). These would clearly not be the only countries involved, and the criteria could
be extended to others sharing similar characteristics in order to widen and deepen involvement and reduce
the eﬀect of free-riding by non-participants in the FF-NPT.
Over time, beyond restricting access to new fossil fuel frontiers, as noted above, an FF-NPT would also have to
pursue the second goal: addressing the managed and accelerated decline of existing investments and infra-
structures. This brings with it the need to ensure that the transition away from fossil fuels is a just one (Caldecott,
Sartor, & Spencer, 2017; Johnstone & Hielscher, 2017; Spencer et al., 2018). Though it would be beyond the remit
of the FF-NPT to proscribe national level measures, experience to date suggests the impacts of fossil fuel decline
on workers and communities can be dampened by using a mix of safety nets, vouchers and cash transfers. This
implies developing and negotiating explicit social contracts for sustainability transitions with losers as well as
winners, including compensation and severance packages (as has occurred in Poland), (re-)training assistance
(which is currently a contested terrain in China in the face of closures of coal plants, see Caldecott et al.
(2017)), or regional economic development programmes (as has been done in Germany). This also underscores
the argument for starting with coal when considering the accelerated decline of existing fossil fuel infrastruc-
tures since the production of coal is highly concentrated.
Financing and Governance
To address issues of equity in sequencing, subsidies at the national level currently going towards ﬁnancing new
fossil fuel exploration as well as supporting existing fossil fuel infrastructures would be redirected towards
meeting energy needs in lower carbon ways. A Global Transition Fund under the FF-NPT could administer
and oversee the reallocation of fossil fuel subsidies, and potentially revenues from a global carbon tax,
towards countries needing additional ﬁnance to meet energy and other needs in lower carbon ways. Such
global redistribution mechanisms are always controversial and encounter signiﬁcant political resistance. But
some means would have to be found for the global recycling of ﬁnancial support to the fossil fuel industry
towards the development of non-fossil fuel infrastructures where they are most needed. A Global Transition
Fund would be distinct from bodies such as the World Bank Climate Investment Funds, but could feasibly
operate under the umbrella of the UN Green Climate Fund rather than attempt to create a new body from
scratch.
The emphasis of the FF-NPT’s Global Transition Fund would be on ﬁnancing energy needs through low
carbon means and not compensating countries for projected lost revenues from leaving fossil fuels in the
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ground. Claims regarding compensation for foregone revenues need to be treated with caution. Harstad (2012)
shows that the cost of compensating producers for output forgone is less than the beneﬁt received including
the cost of damage from emissions. Yet the experience of the Yasuni initiative in Ecuador (where the govern-
ment requested compensation for a share of lost oil revenues if reserves under the Yasuni national park
were to be left in the ground) should strike a note of caution about the the diﬃculty of mobilizing funds for
compensation from the international community and the reluctance to set precedents for other countries to
use their fossil fuel reserves as a basis for demanding payment (Lenferna, 2018; Sovacool & Scarpaci, 2016).
There is clearly a ﬁne line between compensation and what other countries perceive to be extortion. Assess-
ments of the value of reserves of fossil fuels clearly need to be conducted internationally, independently and
veriﬁably as a basis for assessing comparative commitments and targets, as described above, but not as entitle-
ments to compensation.
This leads to the question of which institution would host the negotiation of an FF-NPT. A UN agency or a
coordinating body such as UN-Energy might be among the candidates. The appeal of the UN would be that,
although richer countries would be expected to lead ﬁrst, the treaty would in the end be global and multilateral.
The IEA is often seen as too much of an ‘energy consumers club’, the mirror opposite of the ‘producer’s club’ the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Having a UN agency such as the IAEA involved in mana-
ging the nuclear NPT was critical to its universal legitimacy, and the same will be true for climate change.
Building support for an FF-NPT
What would a political strategy for building support for such an FF-NPT look like? Clearly such a bold proposal,
which would represent a direct threat to some of the most powerful and well-resourced interests in the world,
will face a very high level of opposition. Though this is to be expected and is inevitable from those actors whose
proﬁtability resides in extracting remaining fossil fuels, an FF-NPT would have a number of advocates beyond
climate activist groups. The above-mentioned Lofoten Declaration, signed by 500 organizations from 76
countries, representing business, civil society, universities, research organizations, foundations, cities and
churches, suggests the potential for a broad base of public support, aﬃrming ‘that it is the urgent responsibility
and moral obligation of wealthy fossil fuel producers to lead in putting an end to fossil fuel development and to
manage the decline of existing production’.
The key to setting the negotiations in train will be leadership by a sub-set of states. Those that have already
taken bold stances on supply-side policy, described above, would be strong candidates. As Green and Dennis
suggest, (2018, p. 83) ‘the emergence of international cooperation on fossil fuels is likely to be contingent on a
coalition of early-movers taking unilateral steps to limit or reduce fossil fuel supply’. To capture progress and
generate positive incentives for wider participation, we are suggesting the creation of a LINGO (Leave it In
the Ground) inventory, named after the existing coalition by that name (LINGO, 2018). Rather like the Global
Climate Action portal under the climate change regime1, during a preliminary phase, and while negotiations
proceed on the overall content and architecture of the FF-NPT, countries could submit actions they have under-
taken, or are planning, to a LINGO inventory. This would provide a transparent and comparable register of
countries’ actions that would feed into the negotiations and form the basis for the assessment of existing
reserves and their value, as proposed above. These would also be reﬂected in country NDCs in the context of
the Paris Agreement, calculating emissions saved by not exploiting remaining fossil fuel reserves for the pur-
poses of climate commitments as well as their ﬁnancial value for the purposes of ensuring equity in the FF-NPT.
Potential allies include the climate vulnerable groupings in the climate change negotiations such as the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Especially given the initial emphasis
on obligations for OECD+ countries, such a proposal may garner widespread support. Indeed, the idea behind
the proposal already enjoys cross-party support in a number of OECD countries such as the UK where Labour,
Liberal Democrat and Green party spokespeople have supported the idea, including former Energy and Climate
Minister Ed Davey.2 A letter of support for the Treaty was signed and published by civil society leaders such as
Bill McKibben, Naomi Klein, the heads of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth and the climate group 10:10
(McKibben et al., 2018). Among sub-national states, cities and municipalities there are growing calls to
declare a ‘climate emergency’, especially in light of the IPCC SR15 report. Populations covered by governments
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that have declared a ‘climate emergency’ now exceed 31 million citizens (RTA, 2019). Bans on fossil fuel devel-
opment in their jurisdictions would make a powerful contribution to the movement towards non-proliferation.
Indeed, rather like nuclear-free zones before them (Firmage, 1969), fossil-free zones are being declared in some
regions and could be extended to pronounce a region or municipality’s intention not to approve further fossil
fuel extraction or new infrastructures in the areas over which they exercise authority. There is also scope for
businesses to declare support, beyond those that have signed the Lofoten declaration. For example, an open
letter issued ahead of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference by a coalition convened by the World Economic
Forum, comprising 43 heads of companies with operations in over 150 countries and territories together gen-
erating over $1.2 trillion in revenue, stated ‘the private sector has a responsibility to actively engage in global
eﬀorts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and to help lead the global transition to a low-carbon,
climate-resilient economy’.
There are, nevertheless, many challenges that need to be engaged with. One is to ensure that eﬀorts to
build support for an FF-NPT do not serve as a distraction from the climate change negotiations and under-
mine the implementation of the Paris Agreement. We are conscious that some might fear the initiation of a
new treaty could draw attention, momentum and resources away from the climate regime at the very time
they are most needed. But this would be a very diﬀerent type of treaty and, being complementary, its
negotiation could conversely have a supportive and reinforcing eﬀect on the climate negotiations.
Indeed, it provides one way of implementing the Paris Agreement. The climate regime has to deal with
a whole set of issues around adaptation, ﬁnance, technology, capacity building, and market mechanisms
to name just a few. The beneﬁt of an FF-NPT is that it goes to the heart of the problem. It would
engage and involve diﬀerent state personnel as, though undertaken for environmental ends, it would
more likely be driven by energy and ﬁnance ministries. It provides another arm to the climate regime,
reﬂected in Green and Dennis’s (2018) analogy of using the two hands of the scissors (demand and
supply) to accelerate climate mitigation.
Questions will, of course, be raised about how politically realistic such a proposal is given the current global
collective reliance on fossil fuels. It is certainly the case that the power of incumbent interests should not be
underestimated (Newell & Johnstone, 2018). This includes military actors that are among the largest consumers
of fossil fuels in the world. The webs of power that bind governments to actors in the fossil fuel industry are
dense and wide-ranging (Newell & Paterson, 1998). Concerns over capital ﬂight and carbon leakage are real
and are often mobilized by incumbent interests to resist more ambitious action. But this merely underscores
the need for an international agreement that levels the playing ﬁeld and lays out clearly, transparently and equi-
tably the basis on which remaining reserves will be left in the ground to avoid companies playing governments
oﬀ against one another. It is also often noted that supply-side policies should result in less international carbon
leakage than demand-side policies (Lazarus, Erickson, & Tempest, 2015).
As well as noting the barriers, we also need to acknowledge the growing political momentum behind such a
policy shift. We have already seen how several countries have taken bold national measures. Political tipping
points to accelerate the demise of the global fossil fuel regime provide windows of opportunity to raise
demands for such a treaty. Initiatives to reform fossil fuel subsidies are central to this question, as are contested
but prevalent claims of peak oil, with even OPEC members making statements regarding the importance of
diversifying their energy mixes. Indeed, countries such as Iran and Nigeria generate an appreciable share of elec-
tricity from renewable energy sources and almost 5.4 GW of PV capacity is set to be added by Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries by the ‘early 2020s’, according to a study by IRENA (International Renewable Energy
Agency) (Giﬀord, 2019). Further indicators of an emerging political tipping point away from fossil fuels might
be the growing power of the divestment movement and moves from universities, pension funds and sovereign
wealth funds to discontinue investments in these industries. This has been combined with greater pressure on
companies to disclose their carbon assets and a wave of shareholder activism (Newell, 2008) as well as a broader
de-legitimisation of fossil fuels, as cultural institutions in arts and music also seek to sever their ties to the indus-
try. Market dynamics are also playing their part. The falling costs of solar in particular make renewables cost
competitive with fossil fuels in many regions.
There are also the increasing successes of climate justice movements to leave fossil fuels in the ground
including those resisting speciﬁc fossil fuel infrastructures such as the XL pipeline in the US or fracking in the
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UK, as well as emergent popular campaigns such as Extinction Rebellion and the youth movement for ‘School
Strikes’. Likewise, the costs of business-as-usual fossil fuel use are becoming clear, not just in terms of the climate
crisis, but also air quality and health; According to the World Health Organization, the simple act of breathing is
killing 7 million people a year and harming billions more, with the cost of the lost lives and ill health amounting
to $5 trillion a year, according to the World Bank (Carrington & Taylor, 2018).
Conclusion
This paper has made the case for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, as part of a new wave of supply-side
climate policies that deal with emissions at source. We argued that there is a signiﬁcant window of opportunity
opening up to start negotiations towards such a Treaty as a complement to the Paris Agreement. This is pro-
vided by the clear need to leave substantial remaining reserves of fossil fuels in the ground underscored by
the latest science on climate change, the falling costs of alternatives to fossil fuels and the growing adoption
of supply-side policies by states including bans and moratoria on new fossil fuel extraction.
We spelled out the three key pillars of such an agreement which parallel those of the nuclear NPT: non-pro-
liferation (an agreement not to exploit new reserves), disarmament (the managed decline of existing fossil fuel
infrastructures) and peaceful use (the ﬁnancing of low carbon alternatives through a Global Transition Fund). We
proposed how commitments to phase-out fossil fuels in the form of national targets and timetables could be
sequenced reﬂecting countries current emissions, historical contributions and capacity to transition to alterna-
tive energy sources. We suggested the means are already available to undertake both a global mapping and
assessment of those fossil fuel reserves which, if burned, would carry us across the 1.5°C warming line and
the monitoring and veriﬁcation of commitments to leave them in the ground. A global inventory of supply-
side actions that countries commit themselves to could be established while negotiations proceed in order
to build up momentum. These would be actions which Parties would also list as part of their NDC commitments
under the Paris Agreement to raise the level of ambition. We then explored where the basis of political support
for such a Treaty may lie: in countries vulnerable to the eﬀects of climate change, as well as among those
countries already taking supply-side actions that want to multilateralise such eﬀorts to avoid free-riding by
others, and a whole host of businesses, cities, civil society organizations and others that have committed to
divesting from fossil fuels and resisting new fossil fuel investments.
The challenges such a Treaty would have to overcome are not to be under-estimated. But nor are they insur-
mountable. National eﬀorts are crucial and have set the ball rolling. But a new global Fossil Fuel Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty could provide a transparent and fair means to stop climate breakdown. As E. F. Schumacher
said, ‘Perhaps we cannot raise the winds. But each of us can put up the sail, so that when the wind comes
we can catch it’ (1974, p. 30).
Notes
1. https://unfccc.int/climate-action/introduction-climate-action.
2. https://www.rapidtransition.org/events/launch-event-rapid-transition-alliance/ Accessed February 21st 2019.
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